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Why do small business taxpayers stay with their practitioners? 
Trust, competence and aggressive advice 
 
Abstract 
Self report survey data were used to examine the experiences of 181 small business 
taxpayers with their tax practitioners. Commitment to tax practitioners, defined in 
terms of satisfaction and retention of services, was high among respondents. Using 
hierarchical regression modelling, commitment was associated with using a local 
certified public accountant, having a letter of engagement, receiving cautious, 
competent and aggressive advice (once expectations were controlled), and believing 
the tax practitioner trustworthy. Trust was related to receiving competent and 
cautious advice. Receiving aggressive advice contributed to commitment 
independently of the highly endorsed persona of being professionally competent and 
trustworthy.  
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Why do small business taxpayers stay with their practitioners? Trust, 
competence and aggressive advice 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Small business taxpayers entertain a set of highly ambivalent attitudes toward paying 
tax and remitting taxes to government. They dislike big government and report more 
conflict with tax authorities than other taxpayers (Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2005). 
Compliance costs are widely regarded as being high for small business (Chittenden et 
al., 2003; Noble, 2000).  Collecting taxes from small business owners relies on self-
regulation. Additional record keeping and reporting is burdensome. Small business 
owners are more likely to experience taxation as a painful loss (Kamleitner et al., 
2012).  
 
Add to this a flair for entrepreneurship, a penchant for informality, and a desire to run 
their businesses free from outside interference (Dalley and Hamilton, 2000), it is not 
surprising that small business owners express distaste for taxation (Kirchler, 1999). 
Opportunity to act on their distaste by evading tax is high in small businesses 
(Joulfaian and Rider, 1998; Kamleitner et al., 2012). Small business owners can avoid 
third party oversight and paper trails, with a high volume of financial transactions that 
include cash payments. At the same time, small business taxpayers have as strong a 
need to obey the law as anyone else. As a group they pride themselves on being law-
abiding citizens (Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2005; Taxpayer Advocate Service, 2012). 
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Negative attitudes to taxation and ambivalence about paying tax, combined with the 
complexity of tax law and uncertainty, lead many small business owners to seek the 
services of a tax practitioner, accountant, a business or tax adviser (Blackburn et al.,  
2010; Webley et al., 2002). Research suggests that small businesses seek advice on 
tax matters because they want to file an accurate return, while also saving as much tax 
as they can through legal channels (Hite et al., 1992). In this way they are like the vast 
majority of taxpayers (Collins et al., 1990; Devos, 2012; Tan, 1999).  Unlike most 
taxpayers, however, business taxpayers and their tax advisers can be highly 
interdependent. Tax advisers can become business confidants (Blackburn et al., 2010), 
and over time can assume significant influence over the reputation and financial viability 
of a small business. Due to the role that tax advisers play in the lives of small business 
owners and their business success, it becomes important to ask the question: What are 
the characteristics that are associated with the commitment of small business owners to 
their tax practitioner? 
 
Factors influencing commitment to a tax practitioner 
 
Research in the marketing domain has indicated that there is a direct link between 
customer satisfaction (and service quality) and future retention (or commitment/ 
loyalty) of service providers, and that satisfaction with services is related to 
confirmation or disconfirmation of expectations (Brown and Swartz, 1989; Fullerton 
and Taylor, 2002; Garbarino and Johnson, 1999).  
 
In the tax literature, there are some indications that this may also be the case. 
Taxpayers are reported to have unmet expectations when it comes to seeking advice 
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from a tax adviser in order to save tax (Chang and Bird, 1993; Christensen, 1992). 
Taxpayers have reported willingness to change tax advisers if they are not given the 
advice they expect (Hite and McGill, 1992). Niemirowski et al. (2003) found that 
47% of the tax advisers they surveyed had clients who had threatened to take their 
business elsewhere. The association between unmet expectations and  intention to 
change advisers appears to be a plausible thesis in the small business tax context. 
 
Cautious and aggressive advice 
 
Consistent with the proposition that taxpayers will change their tax advisers if 
expectations are unmet is the segmentation of the tax practitioner market in terms of 
levels of aggressive advice. Increasingly tax practitioners are signalling special 
expertise to capture their market share (Braithwaite, 2005; Karlinsky and Bankman, 
2002). Research suggests that there are practitioners and taxpayers who seek out each 
other for basic no-fuss, no-risk tax advice, and practitioners and taxpayers who seek 
out each other in relation to aggressive advice. In between are a group of tax 
practitioners whose advice might be called “contingent”, meaning that the tax 
practitioner is responsive to the tax environment both in terms of what clients want 
and what tax law and guidance protocols from tax authorities allow (Wurth, 2013; 
also see Spilker, Worsham and Prawitt, 1999 for the importance of context).  
 
Research has shown that the majority of taxpayers who seek the assistance of a tax 
practitioner express a preference for conservative advice (Hite and McGill, 1992; 
Sakurai and Braithwaite, 2003; Tan, 1999). That said, there are suggestions in the 
literature that taxpayers who normally prefer conservative advice may defer to the 
expert opinion of a more aggressive adviser (Murphy, 2002; Tan, 1999). While some 
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taxpayers give instructions as to how aggressive or cautious they want their 
practitioner to be, others do not take control of the situation. Some expect their 
practitioner to know what they want without telling them, and others leave tax matters 
to their practitioner to sort out for them (Ashby and Webley, 2008; Tan, 2011).  The 
absence of clear communication may explain some of the disappointment taxpayers 
express in relation to their tax practitioners. 
 
Communication complications around type of advice 
 
Disappointment with advice may arise also when conditions around tax issues change. 
Tax practitioners try to match the expectations of their clients, offering aggressive 
advice to aggressive clients and conservative advice to conservative clients (Cloyd, 
1995; LaRue and Reckers, 1989; Schisler, 1994). That said, tax practitioner behaviour 
is not always so unwavering across tax issues. Tax practitioners are more likely to 
offer aggressive advice when tax law is ambiguous. When the law is unambiguous, 
tax practitioners lean more toward an enforcer role rather than an exploiter role 
(Klepper et al., 1991). In other words, tax practitioners assert their professional 
judgment as to what is legally defensible. 
 
These modes of adaptation by tax practitioners bring risks around expectations from 
clients, particularly if practitioners fail to explain the reasons behind a switch from 
exploiter to enforcer roles. Taxpayers who experience the exploiter role on one occasion 
may, unrealistically, come to expect such advice across situations, not understanding the 
fine discriminations that the tax practitioner is making in practising his/her craft. This 
may explain why some taxpayers express disappointment with their tax practitioner’s 
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service and want a change, even if the advice being given is protecting them from 
penalties and/or audit.  
 
Professional competence and trust 
 
While there are arguments and evidence to support the proposition that taxpayers will 
shop around for the advice that they want, there are also arguments for why clients 
might stay with one practitioner. As in other professional relationships, taxpayers 
solicit the advice of tax practitioners as experts on what are often complex tax matters 
(Brien, 1998; Frowe, 2005). They may not always defer to this expertise, but in 
general, taxpayers rely on their tax practitioners to do the right thing by them. Doing 
the right thing by taxpayers means being trustworthy. Trustworthiness is inferred 
from the degree to which a tax practitioner abides by a set of professional norms 
(Brien, 1998). Acting with competence, being reliable and dependable, and explaining 
options clearly are all professional norms. They are behaviours that tax practitioners 
demonstrate to taxpayers in order to gain their trust. Competence and trust are at the 
heart of what professionals offer to clients (see Dyer and Ross, 2007; Gooderham et 
al., 2004 for small business context) and underpins the maintenance of their 
relationship (Blackburn et al., 2010). McAllister (1995) has produced evidence to 
show that trusting relationships are important for cooperation, and that demonstrating 
concern and care are a more important part of these relationships than task 
performance. 
 
On occasion some taxpayers undoubtedly challenge their practitioners to find more 
ways to lower the tax they pay. But how practitioners respond is equally important for 
how taxpayers cope with unmet expectations. The work that tax practitioners do in 
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dialogue with clients, educating, persuading and encouraging taxpayers to accept 
responsibility for their decisions, is significant (NAO, 2010; Tomasic and Pentony, 
1991). If the taxpayer finds the message convincing and reassuring, grievance about 
unmet expectations will subside. The taxpayer acquiesces in the face of what they see 
as their tax practitioner’s competence and professional experience: They trust their 
practitioner.  
 
Business planning services and trust 
 
The issue of professional trust has emerged as an important concept in the literature on 
business advisory services (Blackburn et al., 2010; Jarvis and Rigby, 2012). Offers to 
extend services beyond tax advice to include business management have been treated 
with caution by many small businesses. However, they are more likely to be open to 
such advice when they already have trust in their tax practitioner or accountant (Dyer 
and Ross, 2007; Gooderham et al., 2004; Jarvis and Rigby, 2012). Once a small 
business becomes reliant on an adviser for a cluster of services, commitment to that 
particular adviser may receive a considerable boost, above and beyond the trust factor. 
Changing advisers may prove more trouble than it is worth.  
 
The present study 
 
On the basis of this literature, this study postulates four hypotheses to explain why 
taxpayers commit to their tax practitioner: 
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Hypothesis 1 (Instrumental hypothesis): Experiences of aggressive or cautious advice, 
once expectations have been controlled statistically, will predict greater commitment.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (Trust hypothesis): The experience of professional competence and trust 
in a tax practitioner will predict greater commitment. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Communication hypothesis): The use of written agreements to clarify 
the services offered by a tax practitioner will be associated with greater commitment.  
 
Hypothesis 4 (Enmeshment hypothesis): Small businesses receiving business advice 
as well as tax advice will display greater commitment. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and procedure 
 
The questions and sample used for this study were a subset of the data collected from 
a larger cross sectional survey of small and large businesses in New Zealand 
developed and administered by Tan (2009). The survey was conducted using a self-
administered questionnaire, the Business Taxpayer Survey, to elicit business 
taxpayers’ perceptions of tax and tax practitioners as well as demographic and 
background information on the respondent and their firm.   
 
The sample of businesses was derived from two sources. A random sample of 1,400 
business taxpayers’ addresses was obtained from the New Zealand Yellow Pages 
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business search service and a further 100 companies were randomly selected from the 
New Zealand Exchange (NZX). The survey was mailed to businesses. The 
questionnaire was addressed to the managers or business owners of the firms taken from 
the Yellow Pages. For the listed companies, it was addressed to the Chief Financial 
Controller1. One reminder letter with another copy of the questionnaire was sent three 
weeks after the first mailing. 
 
Of the respondents, 222 came from the Yellow Pages sample and 40 from the NZX. 
The usable response rate was 21%, not high, but comparable to many other surveys 
carried out particularly in Australia and New Zealand (Hasseldine et al., 1994; 
Sandford and Hasseldine, 1992). Respondents were divided into two groups to check 
for non-response bias, as those who respond late are usually regarded as similar to 
non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). As only a negligible number of 
variables used in the questionnaire showed a significant difference between early and 
late respondents, the data set is considered to not have any serious known response 
related problems.  
 
A subset of this sample was used for this study of small businesses: businesses that 
reported having fewer than 20 full-time employees. In total, 181 businesses belonged in 
this category. The vast majority (97%) of businesses in New Zealand are regarded as 
small enterprises as they have less than 20 employees (Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment, 2013). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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A breakdown of the small business sample is provided in Table 1 in terms of the 
firm’s social-demographic characteristics and use of tax practitioners. Owners, 
directors and CEOs completed the survey in 83% of cases.  
 
Seventy-eight percent of businesses employed a local or regional Chartered 
Accountancy (CA) firm to help them with their tax work and about 16% used a ‘Big 
4’ CA firm.2 The remainder also sought tax advice outside their business, but instead 
relied on the services of non-chartered accountants (3%) or law firms (3%).  
 
Fifty percent of the businesses had an annual turnover of $500,000 NZ (about 
$426,550 US) or less. The majority of businesses used their tax practitioner’s firms 
for tax purposes only (66%). A further 23% made use of business advisory services as 
well as tax advice. Previous research suggested that small businesses limited their 
contact with advisors, possibly due to costs of time and money (Tan, 1997). While 
this still appears to be the case for most firms, the number using business advisory 
services is not insignificant. 
 
The period of time over which a practitioner’s services had been used was considered 
an important indicator of turnover of clients among tax practitioners. The data 
revealed a considerable range in the duration of engagement of businesses with their 
tax practitioner. Forty-two percent had been with the same practitioner for 5 years or 
less, 26% for 6-10 years, 24% for 11-20 years, and 7% for over 20 years. Most had a 
reasonably stable relationship with their tax practitioner, with 85% reporting no 
change in the past 3 years.  
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In terms of reliance on the tax practitioner for expertise and advice, 73% of 
respondents reported having at least a medium amount of tax knowledge themselves 
and 27% described their own knowledge as low or very low. A significant number of 
small business taxpayers were willing to question the advice of their tax practitioner: 
61% said that occasionally or frequently they expressed disappointment at the advice, 
95% would discuss alternatives with their tax practitioner, and 53% would seek 
another opinion.   
 
Almost half of the respondents had had some involvement with the New Zealand tax 
authority (the Inland Revenue Department (IRD)): 27% had had one audit and 15% 
had had more than one audit.  A sizeable fifty-eight percent had never been audited by 
the IRD. 
 
An engagement letter from the tax practitioners’ firm was reported as being held by 
55% of small business taxpayers. The letter specified the work to be performed, the 
security and confidentiality of private and personal information, and the cost of the 
tax services. 
 
Measures 
 
Expectations and experiences of tax advice and service.  Based on previous work 
(Braithwaite, 2000; Chang and Bird, 1993; Christensen, 1992; Collins et al., 1990; 
Hite et al., 1992), a list of 17 items was compiled of services and advice on taxation 
offered by tax practitioners and expected by their clients. The items covered 
professional competence, and judgment around risk and opportunity.3 Respondents 
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used a scale from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree” to rate each of these 
17 items, first in terms of what taxpayers expected, and second in terms of what 
taxpayers experienced. 
 
The 17 items were reduced to a set of 10 items that at face value represented three 
concepts:4 (1) caution in giving tax advice; (2) readiness to give aggressive advice; 
and (3) competence in explaining and providing clear tax advice. Responses to these 
10 items in terms of expectations were factor analysed using a principal components 
analysis with varimax rotation.5  The purpose was to produce a smaller set of 
relatively independent concepts that could be used in a multiple regression analysis. 
The same procedure was used with responses to the 10 items rated in terms of 
taxpayers’ experiences.   
 
The results for the expectation ratings revealed three factors that corresponded to the 
concepts of caution in giving tax advice, readiness to give aggressive advice, and 
competence in explaining and providing tax advice. This third factor focuses on being 
informative, in the sense of providing small business taxpayers with knowledge and 
understanding that they did not have previously. The loadings of the 10 items on these 
three factors are presented in Table 2. The means for the individual items and their 
standard deviations also appear in Table 2. Means for items ranged from 3.3 to 4.8 on 
a five-point scale. It is of note that expectations were very high that tax practitioners 
would prove themselves capable of explaining complexities, offering solutions and 
providing clarity. Expectations of being given aggressive advice were lower, sitting 
just above the midpoint of the 1-5 “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” scale. 
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When responses to the 10 items in terms of experience were examined using a 
prinicipal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation, a different factor 
solution emerged. The results appear in Table 3. Two factors emerged, one 
representing basic competence and cautious advice, the other representing aggressive 
advice. The means and standard deviations of the experience items are provided in 
Table 3. Experience ratings tended to be lower than expectation ratings, but the 
general pattern was similar with competence highest and aggressive advice lowest. 
That said, it is of note that the range in the experience means is more restricted (3.1 to 
4.2). 
 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 AROUND HERE 
 
The factor analyses in Tables 2 and 3 were used to develop scales to represent: (1) 
expectations of cautious advice; (2) expectations of aggressive advice; (3) 
expectations of competence; (4) experience of cautious advice and competence; and 
(5) experience of aggressive advice. Scales were formed from the items that defined 
the factor, that is, the items that loaded more than .40 on the factor. Responses to the 
set of items defining each factor were averaged to give a mean score for each business 
taxpayer on the three expectation concepts (cautious advice, aggressive advice and 
competence) and the two experience measures (cautious advice and competence, and 
aggressive advice).  
 
The means and standard deviations for these five scales and their intercorrelations are 
provided in Table 4. Expectations for all kinds of advice and service were above the 
midpoint of the scale, suggesting high expectations of tax practitioners among their 
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small business clients. Their experience ratings, while below expectation ratings, were 
nevertheless still positive, falling above the midpoint of the scale.   
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
Trust in practitioner.  Taxpayers’ trust in their practitioner was measured by using a 4-
item scale, which was adapted from Braithwaite (2000). Participants were asked to 
indicate their agreement (on a rating scale from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly 
agree”) to the following statements: My tax practitioner (a) is open and honest with me 
in dealing with my firm’s tax matters; (b) is a trustworthy person; (c) acts in the 
interest of my firm rather than his/her own interests; and (d) has high integrity. The 
scores were averaged to give a mean of 4.42 (SD = .59). The alpha reliability 
coefficient was .91.  
 
Commitment to practitioner. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement on a five-point disagree-agree scale with the following two statements: (a) 
Overall, I am satisfied with my tax practitioner’s services; and (b) I will continue to 
use the same tax practitioner again for my firm next year. Commitment on these two 
measures was high. Only 14% expressed reservations about the service and only 10% 
were unsure about staying with the same practitioner. These measures were adapted 
from Christensen’s (1992) survey questionnaire. Responses to the two items were 
highly correlated (r = .71, p < .001). As those with a high level of satisfaction were 
more likely to express willingness to retain their practitioners’ services, the two items 
were summed and averaged to arrive at a single index with an alpha coefficient of .83 
labelled commitment to a tax practitioner (M = 4.05; SD = .69). 
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Validation check. This study examines the expectations and experiences that correlate 
with commitment to a tax practitioner. Business taxpayers may or may not be aware 
of the connections uncovered through correlational and regression analyses. By the 
same token, it is highly likely that business taxpayers will have their own story of 
when a change in tax practitioners is warranted. With this in mind, small business 
taxpayers were asked under what conditions they were likely to change their tax 
practitioner. They responded on a four-point rating scale from not likely to definitely. 
Seventy-five percent said that it was very likely or definitely the case that they would 
change if they were treated in an unprofessional manner; 68% if the practitioner did 
not inform them of risks associated with the advice; 60% if the practitioner gave 
incorrect advice;  and 48% if the tax practitioner seemed less confident than usual. 
Only 19% said that it was very likely or definite that they would change if the tax 
practitioner gave advice that was too conservative.  
 
Results 
 
The hypotheses were tested using point-biserial and Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients, one way analysis of variance, and hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis.  
 
Bivariate analyses 
Initially, the dependent variable, commitment, was correlated with the likelihood of 
respondents leaving their tax practitioner if the service was inadequate. These items 
were considered a validity check since they reflected a respondent’s willingness to 
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change tax practitioners, and therefore might be expected to correlate negatively with 
practitioner commitment. The validity check was supported for four of the five 
indicators, with the fifth, weakest indicator just failing to reach statistical significance. 
Commitment correlated least well with willingness to leave if the respondent received 
service that was unprofessional (r = -.127, p = .09). Significant negative correlations 
with commitment emerged for not being informed of risks associated with tax advice 
(r = -.150, p < .05), being given incorrect advice (r = -.166, p < .05), if their tax 
practitioner seemed less confident than usual (r = -.171, p < .05), and if the advice 
given was too conservative (r = -.176, p < .05).  
 
For purposes of identifying appropriate control variables for the hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis, the dependent variable, commitment, was correlated with the 
following firm characteristics: (a) enterprises that changed their tax practitioner in last 
three years (scored yes = 1, no = 0); (b) enterprises with short, medium, long or very 
long term relationships with their tax practitioner (scored in 4 intervals (1-5 years = 
1;6-10 years = 2; 10-20 years = 3; more than 20 years = 4)); (c) enterprises that used 
CAs from a Big 4 firm, or a CA from a local firm, or a non-chartered accountant, or 
lawyer (scored local/niche = 1, Big 4 = 0); (d) enterprises that sought business 
advisory services (BAS), other financial services, and only tax services from their 
practitioner’s firm (scored BAS and other services = 1, tax only = 0); (e) enterprises 
that had never been audited by the IRD, or had been audited once, or at least twice 
(scored 0, 1, 2 respectively); and (f)  tax knowledge (rated on a scale from very low = 
1 to very high = 5).  
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Of these variables, only one was significant: whether or not the small business used 
one of the Big 4 Accounting Firms or whether they used a local CA, non-CA or 
lawyer. Commitment was lower for small businesses who had engaged the services of 
one of the Big 4 Accounting Firms and higher for those who had local or niche 
service providers (r = .163, p < .05). This variable will be used as a control variable in 
the regression analysis predicting commitment. 
 
The correlational analysis looking at the relationship between the use of a suite of 
services beyond tax suggested that enmeshment with a service provider as specified in 
Hypothesis 4 was not associated with greater commitment to that provider for small 
businesses. As a further test, a one-way analysis of variance was carried out 
comparing three groups (Tax only, Tax + other financial services but not BAS, Tax + 
BAS) in terms of commitment to their practitioner. The means for the groups on 
commitment were highest for the BAS + Tax group (M = 4.21, SD = .70), second 
highest for the Tax only group (M = 4.02, SD = .68), and lowest for the Tax + other 
financial services but not BAS group (M = 3.81, SD = .70). The differences were not 
statistically significant: the F value for the analysis of variance was 2.295 (p = .104). 
A Least Squares Difference test on pairs of means showed a significant difference 
between the BAS group and the other financial services group (p < .05), but this did 
not work in favour of the hypothesis. There is no evidence that enmeshment in other 
services was associated with commitment. In other words Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported.  
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Support was found, however, for Hypothesis 3. Small business owners with an 
engagement letter were more likely to be committed to their tax practitioner (r = .213, 
p < .01). 
 
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
 
On the first step of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis, one background 
variable and one communication variable were added to the equation: (a) local or 
niche practitioner versus Big 4; and (b) use of an engagement letter. Both variables 
made a significant contribution to the variance accounted for in commitment. 
Commitment was higher when a local or niche practitioner was used and when an 
engagement letter was used.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
 
 Next, the expectation variables were entered so that expectations were statistically 
controlled before experiences were entered into the model.  
 
On the third step the experience variables of receiving cautious and competent advice, 
and receiving aggressive advice were included in the model. At this stage, two major 
changes occurred. Both kinds of experience contributed positively to explaining 
variation in commitment. Higher commitment was associated with the experience of 
cautious and competent advice, and with aggressive advice, after expectations had 
been controlled. When these experiential variables were included, the use of a local or 
niche practitioner weakened considerably as a predictor of commitment, suggesting 
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common variance between this background variable and one of the experiential 
variables. The correlation matrix for the regression analysis showed that the variable 
that had the strongest correlation with using a local or niche provider was the 
experience of receiving cautious and competent advice (r = .261, p < .01). This 
suggests that local and niche practitioners, in general, provide to small businesses a 
more cautious and competent service, and this in turn, is associated with high 
commitment. 
 
In the fourth and final step, trust in the tax practitioner was included in the model. 
Both use of an engagement letter and receiving aggressive advice remained 
significant as predictors in Model 4. Other significant loadings weakened as trust 
became a major contributor in the regression model. The explanation in Model 4 for 
the non-significance of experience of cautious and competent advice parallels the 
explanation for the non-significance of local and niche providers in Model 3. The 
experience of cautious and competent advice correlated most highly with receiving 
aggressive advice (r = .62, p < .001), but second most highly with trust (r = .59, p < 
.001) (see Table 4). When all three variables were in the regression equation, the 
individual contribution of the variable, the experience of cautious and competent 
advice, is likely to be dominated by the others, in particular, the new variable, trust.  
 
The regression model presented in Table 5 provides support for both Hypotheses 1 
and 2. Receiving services that were competent, cautious and aggressive for clients, 
once expectations were taken into account, was associated with stronger commitment 
to one’s tax practitioner; thereby showing that instrumental, task oriented delivery of 
services matters.  At the same time, the relational variable of trust played a very 
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important role in the prediction of commitment. As expected from previous research, 
trust was related to professional competence, but it contributed above and beyond 
professional competence to show that the relationship established between the tax 
practitioner and the small business was relevant in its own right to retention of one’s 
practitioner. These findings suggest that trust can contribute to commitment when 
other instrumental indicators around expectations of service are producing 
disappointing outcomes.  
 
Discussion 
 
This study of 181 small businesses in New Zealand reveals a sector that seeks tax 
advice primarily from local CA practitioners and has been cautious in embracing 
additional assistance such as business advisory services. These small business 
taxpayers were relatively knowledgeable about tax matters and most expected 
competent and cautious advice from their tax practitioner. Over half of the small 
businesses had been with their tax practitioner for more than 5 years and had a letter 
of engagement with their practitioner. Commitment to their tax practitioner was high, 
but over half expressed a willingness to change if they were not warned of the risks 
associated with tax advice or if they had been given incorrect tax advice.   
 
Within this sample of small business taxpayers, four hypotheses were tested, three of 
which were supported. Hypothesis 1 captured instrumental reasons for retaining the 
services of a tax practitioner: receiving aggressive advice and receiving competent 
and cautious advice. While aggressive advice retained significance across models, 
competent and cautious advice lost its significance once trust was entered into the 
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regression model. Competent and cautious advice was aligned with trust in 
respondents’ minds, a coupling of concepts that has been noted by others (Brien, 
1998; Frowe, 2005). Previous research also has shown how taxpayers can embrace 
both aggressive tax options and cautious advice simultaneously (Sakurai and 
Braithwaite, 2003). In the hands of a competent and trusted adviser, aggressive 
options are not so much risky as sophisticated and clever.  Hypothesis 2 represented 
relational reasons for staying with a tax practitioner through the variable, trust, and 
was supported. The higher the trust, the stronger was the commitment to the tax 
practitioner. Hypothesis 3 was supported and recognised the importance of 
communication through engagement letters. Those small business taxpayers with 
engagement letters showed stronger commitment to their practitioner. Hypothesis 4 
was not supported. Hypothesis 4 suggested that enmeshment in a suite of services 
including business advisory services would be associated with stronger commitment 
to a tax practitioner. This was not shown to be the case. 
 
These results demonstrate the importance of both instrumental and relational factors 
in explaining commitment to a tax practitioner. The combination of trustworthiness 
and knowledge of how to aggressively minimize tax appeared to be a winning 
combination of attributes for tax practitioners seeking clients among this small 
business sector. The finding also explains how taxpayers can be genuinely shocked 
when tax authorities disallow claims filed through a tax practitioner. Small business 
taxpayers clearly like to minimize the tax they pay, but they feel secure in the 
professionalism of their practitioner. The finding also speaks to the logic behind tax 
authorities’ warnings to taxpayers not to blindly follow tax practitioners offering them 
advice that is “too good to be true”. If trust in the tax practitioner or adviser is not 
 23 
well founded, taxpayers can find themselves with substantial tax liabilities upon audit 
(for example, see Murphy, 2002) that may threaten the survival of their businesses. 
 
The regression results provided interesting insights into the underpinnings of trust in a 
tax practitioner. Consistent with the literature (Brien, 1998; Frowe, 2005), trust was 
linked closely with perceptions of professional competence, which included caution. 
Professional competence in this setting meant that practitioners were clear about the 
law, what was possible for reducing taxes and what was not, and were able to explain 
to their clients in easy to understand language about their tax situation. Trust was 
most commonly found between small business and local or niche advisers as opposed 
to Big 4 accountancy firms. This finding sits comfortably alongside the recent study 
of Marshall et al. (2010), which found that in Australia, the more aggressive tax 
advice came from the Big 4 tax practitioners. It is an interesting question whether the 
brand of giving aggressive advice by firms, while attractive to some, puts off potential 
clients who prefer a more cautious approach. Of relevance in the regression analysis 
is that when client experiences were entered, the variable measuring use of a Big 4 
CA rather than a local or niche practitioner became non-significant.  
 
International research has repeatedly pointed to the importance of establishing 
trusting relationships with financial advisers if small businesses are to avail 
themselves of the services of business advisers who can improve the efficiency and 
productivity of their enterprises (Blackburn et al., 2010; Dyer and Ross, 2007; 
Gooderham et al., 2004; Jarvis and Rigby, 2012). The findings of this study suggest 
that in contexts where allegiances lie more strongly with local CAs than multinational 
accountancy firms, the growth of the small business sector may best be advanced 
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through local initiatives to increase the skill set of local practitioners (de Clercq, 
Thongpapanl, and Voronov, 2014). Local practitioners may be more able to bridge the 
gap between professional advisers and small business through better local knowledge 
and thicker social networks which can carry the message of the added value of 
engaging with business advisory services (Sarapaivanich and Patterson, 2014).  
 
The most intriguing finding to emerge from this study was the sustained importance 
of a letter of engagement in relation to commitment. Interpreting this finding is 
difficult because of issues of causality, but the intrigue lies in the fact that the 
contribution of this variable in the regression was not suppressed with the inclusion of 
trust. The engagement letter is not primarily a means of establishing trust; it 
contributes above and beyond trust to explaining commitment of small business 
taxpayers to their tax practitioner. Perhaps formalising the nature of the exchange 
means that small business taxpayers and their tax practitioners have an open and frank 
discussion about the nature of their relationship, including who will do what for 
whom. Clear communication may pave the way for commitment. On the other hand, 
the reverse may also be true. When a small business taxpayer is ready to make a 
commitment to a tax practitioner, only then are they prepared to sign an engagement 
letter that entails commitments on both sides. This study cannot disentangle these 
interpretations. Both at this point remain plausible, awaiting further investigation.  
 
Limitations of the study 
 
Limitations in the current study primarily relate to design and sample. The usual 
problems of paper and pencil surveys are present in this data set. The researchers do 
 25 
not know how much time or effort went into completing the survey, how reliable and 
valid the answers are, and whether the respondents had a vested interest in presenting 
their businesses in a particular way. In defence of the method, the results were 
generally consistent with other data available and answers to the open-ended 
questions suggested genuine engagement with the survey. In this context one caveat 
of which the reader should be mindful is that this study measures small business 
taxpayers’ perceptions of the performance of tax practitioners: We do not know if 
practitioners actually did offer cautious, competent or aggressive advice. Results have 
to be interpreted within a self-reporting framework.  
 
 One significant methodological limitation is the cross-sectional nature of the data. 
Understanding the role of engagement letters requires a design which allows for 
measurement at different time points with the letter of engagement becoming an 
intervention, possibly in a random control trial.  
 
Also deserving of criticism is the sample of business taxpayers recruited for the study. 
The sample was drawn primarily from the Yellow Pages and as such was not 
representative of industry groups nor presumably of new businesses that may not have 
registered for inclusion in this directory. There is a certain homogeneity in the sample 
that may have restricted research opportunities, particularly in relation to being the 
recipient of aggressive, cautious and professionally competent advice.  In larger, more 
varied samples with businesses and tax practitioners, it has been easier to differentiate 
these three dimensions of skills that tax practitioners offer to their clients (Tan, 2009; 
Wurth, 2013). Of particular interest in this regard would have been a more varied 
practitioner sample. The dominant group were identified as Chartered Accountants 
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(CAs). Few businesses reported using lawyers or non-CAs. The major accounting and 
tax professional associations in New Zealand (NZICA and ATAINZ)6 and in their 
near-by neighbour, Australia (CPA Australia), have professional codes of ethics that 
recognise public interest as well as obligations towards clients.  These may differ 
from the New Zealand Law Society’s Rules of Conduct and Client Care delineating 
the ethical responsibilities of lawyers. Comparing these practitioner groups in future 
research, particularly given the findings of Marshall et al. (2010) in Australia, may 
provide interesting insights into the relative importance of giving aggressive and 
cautious advice. In the current sample, the correlation between different types of 
advice is high, placing limits on understanding how and when these experiences 
conflict and co-exist.  
 
Discussion of this problem gives rise to considering the value of the site of this study. 
New Zealand is a small tax jurisdiction dominated by small enterprises. Can the 
findings be generalised? Levels of trust (generally very high) may well be an artefact 
of this environment in which the study has been conducted. It does not follow from 
this assertion, however, that trust is not relevant to commitment to a tax practitioner in 
other jurisdictions. Other studies internationally underline the importance of trust in 
professional relationships (Blackburn et al., 2010). But it is conceivable that trust 
operates differently in different contexts. In a globalised world with multinational 
companies offering services in vastly different contexts, unpacking these differences 
and demonstrating that one size does not fit all has both academic and practical 
significance. In the context of this paper, trust had been cultivated and nurtured in a 
way that aligns it with cautious advice and accounting professionalism.  In other 
contexts, however, where professional ethics are not strong and governance 
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institutions are weaker, trust could be aligned just as easily with the provision of 
highly aggressive, if not illegal options for avoiding tax. How professional services 
evolve and compete for clients and how small businesses engage their services does 
not occur in a cultural vacuum. Context matters, and the strength of governance 
institutions to ensure high professional standards and lawful conduct is a necessary 
part of growing small businesses in a sustainable way. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1  Or the person who makes or helps to make the tax decisions for the firm. 
 
2  The Big 4 CA firms were Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers. 
 
3  An open-ended question allowed participants to indicate other expectations 
which were not on the list. Only two participants suggested other expectations 
they had of their tax practitioners, i.e. to ‘do the job accurately and completely 
the first time’ and to ‘have after hours if advice is needed.’ 
 
4  The seven items culled from the original set appear in the note below Table 2. 
The excluded items had ambiguous relationships with other items. Many were 
multi-factored or were poorly correlated with other items. 
 
5  All statistical analysis was performed using SPSS v. 20.  
 
6  i.e. New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) and Accountants 
and Tax Agents Institute of New Zealand (ATAINZ). 
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Table 1.  Profile of small businesses that took part in the Business Taxpayer Survey (n = 181) 
 Frequency % 
Full time employees 
0 
1-  5 
6-19 
 
 
 29 
 91  
  61 
181 
 
  16.0 
  50.3 
33.7 
100.0 
Position in firm 
Director 
Owner-manager 
CEO/CFO 
Accountant 
Financial Controller 
Partner 
Other 
 
  72 
  70 
  7 
  5 
  11 
    9 
   5 
 179 
 
40.2 
 39.1 
   3.9 
   2.8 
 6.1 
   5.0 
    2.8 
100.0 
Practitioners’ affiliation 
Big 4 CA firm 
A local or regional CA firm 
A non CA firm 
An attorney/law firm 
 
   28 
 141 
     5 
      5 
 179 
 
  15.6 
  78.3 
    2.8 
      2.8 
 1000 
Turnover 
Up to $40000 
>40000-$100,000 
>$100,000- $500,000 
>$500000 - $1 million 
>1 million-5 million 
>5 million-$20 million 
>$20 million - $50 million 
 
 
  13 
  18 
  56 
  26 
  49 
  11 
   1 
 174 
 
    7.5 
    10.3 
  32.2 
  14.9 
  28.2 
  6.3 
  .6 
100.0 
Use of other services 
No other service used 
Audit 
Business advisory 
Other services 
Combination of the above 
 
119 
  11 
  41 
    5 
  5 
181 
 
65.7 
 6.1 
 22.7 
   2.8 
   2.8 
100.0 
No of years with current practitioner 
1-5 
6-10 
11-20 
>20 
 
76 
  46 
  44 
  13 
179 
 
  42.5 
  25.7 
  24.5 
    7.3 
100.0 
Level of tax knowledge 
Very low 
Low 
 
    8 
  41 
 
   4.4 
 22.8 
 33 
Medium 
High  
Very high 
 
106 
  23 
    2 
180 
 58.9 
 12.8 
   1.1 
100.0 
Experience of IRD audit 
No 
Once 
More than once 
 
104 
  49 
  27 
180 
 
57.8 
 27.2 
 15.0 
100.0 
Letter of engagement 
No 
Yes 
 
80 
  96 
176 
 
45.5 
 54.5 
100.0 
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Table 2.  Loadings on three factors emerging from a principal components analysis with varimax 
rotation for items representing expectations of tax practitioners 
 
Types of advice or 
service 
Mean 
(SD) 
Factor 1 
Competent 
Factor 2 
Aggressive 
Factor 3 
Cautious 
Creative in dealing with 
tax matters 
4.02 
(.96) 
.196 .779 .135 
Able to exploit tax 
loopholes to firm’s 
advantage 
3.90 
(1.10) 
   .168 .789 .010 
Provides aggressive 
advice where tax law is 
ambiguous 
3.28 
(1.12) 
-.032 .781 .074 
Promotes any tax 
effective schemes 
4.32 
(.78) 
.298 .666 .129 
Makes claims only when 
they are clearly legitimate 
4.43 
(.70) 
.214 .103 .795 
Advises not to make 
deductions in grey areas 
of tax law 
3.98 
(.93) 
.098 .091 .850 
Is up to date with latest 
changes to tax law 
4.79 
(.41) 
.836 .041 -.024 
Reduces uncertainties 4.52 
(.55) 
.706 .352 .304 
Explains tax law using 
words we understand 
4.57 
(.61) 
.756 .244 .221 
Is clear about risks 
associated with advice 
4.48 
(.61) 
.633 .111 .488 
Percentage of variance 
accounted for prior to 
rotation 
 40% 16% 10%  
Note: The following items were dropped because they were ambiguous, loading poorly across 
factors: (1) Deals with tax matters with minimum fuss; (2) Provides conservative advice where tax 
law is unambiguous; (3) Helps file an accurate return; (4) Helps to minimise tax; (5) Saves 
considerable time by dealing with tax; (6) Helps avoid tax penalties; (7) Knows many ways of 
saving tax. After dropping these items, the communalities of the 10 remaining items in the factor 
analysis were high ranging from .55 to .74. 
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Table 3.  Loadings on two factors emerging from a principal components analysis with varimax 
rotation for items representing experiences with tax practitioners 
 
Types of advice or service Mean 
(SD) 
Factor 1 
Competent 
and Cautious 
Factor 2 
Aggressive 
Creative in dealing with tax 
matters 
3.44 
(.97) 
.273 .807 
Able to exploit tax loopholes to 
firm’s advantage 
3.24 
(.97) 
.061 .816 
Provides aggressive advice where 
tax law is ambiguous 
3.06 
(.99) 
.265 .672 
Promotes any tax effective 
schemes 
3.47 
(.99) 
.322 .694 
Makes claims only when they are 
clearly legitimate 
4.12 
(.65) 
.817 .106 
Advises not to make deductions in 
grey areas of tax law 
3.74 
(.88) 
.753 .145 
Is up to date with latest changes to 
tax law 
4.17 
(.70) 
.453 .526 
Reduces uncertainties 3.93 
(.86) 
.649 .492 
Explains tax law using words we 
understand 
4.02 
(.89) 
.656 .310 
Is clear about risks associated with 
advice 
3.91 
(.76) 
.735 .378 
Percentage of variance accounted 
for prior to rotation 
 50% 12% 
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Table 4.   Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients among small business taxpayers’ 
expectations, experiences, trust and commitment to tax practitioners (alpha reliability coefficients 
in diagonal) 
 
Small business 
taxpayers’ views 
on practitioners   
(M, SD) 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1.  Expectation of 
competent advice 
(4.59, .44) 
.81       
2.  Expectation of 
cautious advice 
(4.21, .70) 
.47*** .64      
3.  Expectation of 
aggressive advice 
(3.89, .77) 
.43*** .26*** .78     
4.  Experience of 
competent and 
cautious advice  
(3.94, .64) 
.38*** .43*** .16* .84    
5. Experience of 
aggressive advice 
(3.48, .70) 
.26*** .24*** .39*** .62*** .82   
6. Trust  
(4.42, .59) 
.43*** .24*** .19* .59*** .43*** .91  
7. Commitment 
(4.05, .69) 
.18*** .08*** .09 .52*** .53*** .53*** .83 
** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
  
 37 
Table 5.  Hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis predicting commitment to tax practitioner 
from expectations, experiences and trust while controlling for background variables 
 
Predictor Model
1 
Stand
ardize
d beta 
(SE) 
Model 
2  
Stand
ardize
d beta 
(SE) 
Model
3 
Stand
ardize
d beta 
(SE) 
Model
4 
Stand
ardize
d beta 
(SE) 
Use of local CPA 
practitioner (1) or Big 4 (0) 
.21**
* 
(.14) 
.20** 
(.14) 
.12 
(.12) 
.10 
(.12) 
Provision of engagement 
letter 
.26*** 
(.10) 
.24*** 
(.10) 
.17** 
(.09) 
.15* 
(.08) 
Expectations of competent 
advice  
 .16 
(.14) 
.07 
(.12) 
-.02 
(.12) 
Expectations of cautious 
advice 
 -.02 
(.08) 
-.16* 
(.07) 
-.13 
(.07) 
Expectations of aggressive 
advice 
 -.03 
(.07) 
-.13 
(.07) 
-.12 
(.06) 
Experience of competent 
and cautious advice 
  .30*** 
(.10) 
.17 
(.10) 
Experience of aggressive 
advice 
  .38*** 
(.08) 
.35*** 
(.08) 
Trust    .30*** 
(.09) 
Adjusted R2  .08*** .08** .38*** .43***  
 
 
